

# **New Research in Phenomenology, Psychology and Psychoanalysis**

Annual Conference of the *Romanian Society for Phenomenology*  
organized by the *Department of Philosophy, The Department of Philosophy in Hungarian  
Language and Center for Applied Philosophy*  
of *Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca*

with the support of the *European Foundation Cluj-Napoca* and *The Regional Committee  
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Cluj (KAB)*

November 24<sup>th</sup>-25<sup>th</sup>, 2017  
Cluj-Napoca, Romania

## **Coordinators:**

Ion Copoeru, Attila Szigeti, Cristian Bodea

## **Abstracts:**

### **Is intentionality a better concept than finality or teleonomy to describe biological individual behavior?**

Raphael Aybar

University of Vienna

CLAFEN (Latin American Circle of Phenomenology), Austria

Santiago Theory of Cognition (Maruna, Varela and followed by Evan Thompson) propose that a biological individuality is defined by autopoiesis or self-making, in which the individual as a system produce its own components in a relation to its environment. Maturana, in biology, has refused to accept the concept of finality or teleonomy to describe this Phenomena. Instead of that, he believed that any living being could be explained in mechanistic terms. My purpose is to present that critic to finality or teleonomy to show how the phenomenological concept of intentionality is more accurate to describe biological individual behavior. My exposition is divided in three parts: in the first part, it is explained the concept of autopoiesis and its reception in contemporary phenomenology (Varela and Thompson). In the second part, it is described the critic to employment of finalistic description of the biological individual and the alternatives developed by Varela and Thompson. In the last part of the presentation, it is argued that we can employ the concept of intentionality or constitution of sense to comprehend the behavior of the self-making of biological individuals.

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## **La main passive et sa manœuvre littéraire**

Patricia Apostol

CEREFREA Villa Noël, University of Bucharest, Romania

Between the withdrawal of the hand that writes, in Blanchot's case, and the hand that disobeys the pictorial intent, in Bacon's case, I will explore the dynamic of the rapport between passivity and creation in order to interrogate on the specificity of the literary and artistic discourse that results from such a rapport; and, then, finally, to ask if the discourse produced through passivity, in its figural becoming, solicits, through the submission of the intention to the accident, the opus as a literal *manœuvre* and *manière* (in the etymological sense: "made by the hand" and, respectively, "held by the hand").

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## **Manifest nothingness, active nothingness, effective nothingness: an attempt onto the ontology of Mihai Șora**

Bobb Cătălin

Technical University of Cluj-Napoca, North University Center of Baia Mare, Romania

In my talk I will try to address the question of nothingness as understood by the Romanian philosopher Mihai Șora. In his view, the path toward to be, beside being an act of continuous inner dialog, is always surrounded by its clone (or twin brother) to appear. Thus, in order to grasp our inner selves we have to, firstly, find the right question (a question as particular as any each of us are) and give the just answer (an answer that does not support any oscillation) and, secondly, to see and overcome the illusion of nothingness (manifest, active and effective). It is true that nothingness has, almost, an ontological status therefore to appear seems to be, but the core problem here is not ontological but ethical. Consequently, the question is how can we overcome ourselves from the paths of nothingness? Thus, in my talk I will try, following closely the argumentation of Mihai Șora, to see, and perhaps to seal, a cluster of possible leads in which nothingness is, if not overcome, at least exposed.

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## **The Body Makes Sense. A Phenomenology of Ego and I in Conjunction with Psychoanalysis**

Cristian Bodea

Babeș-Bolyai University, Center for Applied Philosophy, Romania

Starting from the idea of corporeality and the complexity of the problems it raises in phenomenology, the present paper aims to shed light on the way in which subjectivity is structured by one's being incarnated. We will therefore speak of the constitution of the subject as not being free and autonomous, namely as not being the subject of pure consciousness, but as being subjected to causal ties (the subject is not his own cause), be they simply the ties of mere incarnation.

The subject is the subject of the unconscious, Lacanian psychoanalysis affirms. Furthermore the same Lacanian psychoanalysis stated that the unconscious is structured as a language and that it follows the path of language. Hence it seems not only that the subject has much more to do with consciousness as was previously believed but that he is also divided, besides the fact that he is not free. The subject is divided between him and himself, between *ego* and I, by the unconscious. But, as if that were not enough, the Lacanian unconscious puts extra pressure on the subject, adding the weight of language. Forced to phenomenally himself because of that, oscillating perpetually between *ego* and I, the subject requires an unconscious that goes beyond language, a necessity Lacan himself perceived. His idea of unconscious as *lalangue*, namely real unconscious, concedes to the subject the freedom he needs to make a shift from the imaginary to the symbolic (and vice versa).

At the same time when Lacan was launching his idea, Merleau-Ponty came up with the idea of the phenomenological unconscious that Marc Richir takes over and opposes to the symbolic unconscious. The dichotomy between the two epistemological types of unconscious leaves the subject in a state of indeterminacy, a state that allows the subject to give himself meanings. The first of the meanings is that of the body, a body whose flesh is given by language.

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### **Jung and Existentialism**

Ștefan Bolea

Babeș-Bolyai University, Romania,

In the following paper I will argue that there are interesting connections between the founder of analytical psychology, Carl Gustav Jung, and the school of existentialism. Analytical psychology and existentialism share almost the same *Zeitgeist* (becoming influential between the 1930's and 1960's) and are both interested in the concept of individuality. I would like to follow the liaison between Jung and existentialism regarding authenticity and death. First of all, the concept of authenticity deserves extensive treatment. Heidegger's *das Man* and Sartre's *mauvaise foi* have an interesting companion in Jung's analysis of *persona*, the psychological concept of "the mask". Second of all, existentialist authenticity can be compared to the Jungian integration of the shadow. Moreover, the concept of death (Heidegger's *Sein-zum-Tode*) can be compared with Jung's understanding of death from *The Red Book*.

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### **Rethinking Human Relatedness in Psychoanalysis: A Heideggerian Perspective**

Boroomandjazi Khashayar,

Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran

The paper aims to examine the concept of human relatedness in psychoanalytic research in light of Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of human being and the Daseinsanalytic movement influenced by his thought. It first addresses the significance

and the conceptual foundations of the so-called interpersonal-relational shift in psychoanalysis. Then, the different senses of human relatedness will be illustrated based on Heidegger's insights into the nature of man's existence. Marking Heidegger's distinction between the essential being-in-relationship-to the beings and the fundamental being-in-relationship-to the understanding of being is of great importance in this regard. Finally, it will be shown that though the interpersonal-relational approach in psychoanalysis can be considered in harmony with Heidegger's emphasis on the relational character of human being in certain aspects, it can itself be under criticism from a Heideggerian perspective.

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### **Human Suffering and Pain: when phenomenology meets the clinic**

Smadar Bustan

Philosophy Department, Sorbonne Paris 4, France

Department of Cognitive and Clinical Neuroscience, Central Institute of Mental Health,  
University of Heidelberg, Mannheim, Germany

My combined work in phenomenology, experimental and clinical research proposes an integrative approach for better assessing and elucidating human pain and suffering. The contribution of the phenomenological analysis is crucial to our understanding of the life world of the pain despite the methodological split between the philosophical and clinical perspectives. Having tested the integrative approach in experimental pain with healthy subjects in Germany and Luxembourg and currently with chronic pain patients at the hospital in Paris, it seems to offering innovative ways to measure and explain the suffering associated with pain.

Based on my line of research inscribed in French phenomenology (Levinas, Marion, Ricoeur and Blanchot), the **first part** of the presentation will propose a **theoretical definition** of suffering and pain. I suggest to focus on their lived experience so that instead of asking "what is pain?" we rather look into "how pain is experienced?". This phenomenological shift is then translated into general dimensions (my Fan model), exposing both the facticity of a person's lived experience and the best representative category. In the **second part**, I will demonstrate how I actually apply this investigation to patients in our pain clinic. My purpose is to show that in remaining sufficiently attentive to the subjective modalities of the individual experience (phenomenology), with respect to the standardized scientific and clinical expertise, this approach ensures objective validity and relevance to large and variable populations in hospital settings.

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## **Undergoing an experience with language**

Eveline Cioflec

independent researcher, Romania

In my paper I will discuss M. Heidegger's concept of experience in the lectures "The Nature of Language" first presented as a lecture in 1957. Heidegger envisages the possibility of "undergoing an experience with language": "To undergo an experience with language [...] means to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering into and submitting to it." (Heidegger 1959, 57) Different from the Greek concept of "empeiria", further elaborated by Heidegger in his lectures on Hegel, experience in this essay refers to "*eundo assequi*", to obtain something along the way, on the run. Yet, this experience "will touch the innermost nexus of our existence" (Heidegger 71). Moreover, experience with language is meant in a passive way – it is not actively made but rather received, hence given. An earlier essay sheds light into this text: In 1952 Heidegger discusses, with Heraclitus, "Logos" als Being, as aboriginal Logos, in his essay "Logos" (and more extensively in his lectures on Heraclitus in 1944). The essay has been translated by J. Lacan in 1956, who thought to have found an ally in Heidegger, admitting that the latter's work has been "propedeutic" for his own work. (Lacan 1977; Richardson 2003) However, for Heidegger experience with language (language speaks the human being) leads to poetry, and he never proves to be interested in the psychoanalytic significance of language in Lacan's work (language speaks the human subject – "the symbolic order to which he is referring as Other than the subject", Richardson 2003).

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## **Collaborative Phenomenological Practices**

Alexandru Cosmescu

Academy of Sciences of Moldova, Republic of Moldova

Various phenomenologists have developed structured contexts in which to train in a certain exploratory and collaborative phenomenological discursive practice, seen as embodying and building upon Husserl's own intentions and way of working. One of the proposals is a workshop-based approach, inspired by H. Spiegelberg and described by E. Casey. Another is the "debriefing interview" of P. Vermersch, developed in an explicitly phenomenological direction by N. Depraz. Apart from their value in teaching phenomenology as a living approach, the intersubjective and open-ended character of these practices helps practitioners avoid becoming stuck in "bad subjectivity" or simply confirm what they already "knew".

Philosophical consultation in the style proposed by the French philosophical practitioner Oscar Brenifier offers at least two possibilities for phenomenologically inspired intersubjective exploration: the use of eidetic variation as an exercise in "conceptualization" and the use of short experiential descriptions as a starting point for equally experiential objecting and questioning in a workshop format. I will discuss a (tentative) methodology for doing this, obstacles that may appear as part of the group dynamic, and the possible results of this kind of workshops.

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**Convergence and divergence points between phenomenology and psychology. The concept of mindfulness**

Lorena Cozneac  
Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

At this conference, I will present the concept of mindfulness from two different perspectives, as a interdisciplinary study between phenomenology and psychology and the way these can contribute at a better understanding of the phenomenon in the present. While the concept of mindfulness is described the first time in Asia, in buddhist tradition Theravada, its phenomenological nature is similar to some of the philosophical and psychological schools of thinking from the West. Phenomenology and some recent cognitive sciences suggest the existence of two primary modes of conscious processing. Husserl named them " natural attitude" and " phenomenological attitude". Natural attitude is an orientation inwards, towards others and towards the world in which the events and experiences are treated like objects on to whom we cognitively operate. Phenomenological reduction of Husserl is the suspension of natural attitude, after which the mental flux of cogitations comes back to the individual. Mindfulness in therapeutic context, on the inside of psychology, is an adjacent of the classical techniques of psychotherapy with main role of auto-observation and quietness of thoughts. We are going to follow which are the similarities and the distinctions as far as it concerns their aims.

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**Psychic Reality and the Name of the Father.  
Emmanuel Lévinas' Phenomenology between Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan**

Livia Dioşan  
Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

There are three forms of nomination: imaginary, symbolic and real. Jacques Lacan puts them in correspondence with the Freudian inhibition, symptom, and anxiety. Of these three forms of nomination, anxiety can turn into a symptom. If, on the one hand, anxiety introduces discontinuity, the symptom gives a permanence, a sort of tranquility, because its temporality is determined by its own formation, namely that of an arrested time. Father is more than a name, he is who gives name to all things, starting with the symbolic, imaginary and real, which are the "first names". Lacan arrives at the logical reduction of the Name of the Father in the articulation which he operates between the real father, the actual agent of castration, the imaginary father, that enjoys all the women, and the dead father, as all these can be found in the Freudian myth of "Totem and Tabou". It is necessary that there be A real father to say "no", therefore a fourth term is necessary in order for the borromeanity of the knot not to be lost. This fourth term corresponds to what Freud called "the Oedipus complex" or the psychic reality, which Lacan first calls

the name of the Father and calls it by the name of symptom, then sinthome, but we mention that along the way the meanings of these three terms do not remain similar.

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### **Phenomenology and argumentation**

Iovan Drehe

Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Phenomenology and argumentation theory do not seem to be the closest of disciplines. However, there seem to be at least one exception among argumentation scholars: Charles Arthur Willard (b. 1945). The main focus of the second of Willard's books on argumentation, *A Theory of Argumentation* (1989) is the agent, argumentation being considered in the context of social interaction and communication, with an important emphasis given to the mundane and everyday life argumentative behavior – Willard taking a somewhat non-orthodox stance in contrast with the majority of argumentation theorists in terms of, for instance, relevance given to models such as Toulmin's. One of the influences on Willard was Alfred Schütz, who is widely known for his works in social phenomenology. In the present paper, I aim to discuss some of the specificities of Willard's view on argumentation from the angle of Schütz's influence. For example, social interactions of an argumentative kind should be considered in light of what is called 'intersubjectivity', 'joint awareness' or 'reciprocity of perspectives', these having a hierarchical and multileveled nature. Considering these, I will end the paper by discussing the possible consequences of a phenomenological import in argumentation theory.

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### **Le Labyrinthe d'air.**

#### **La structure des fantasmes dans l'anthropologie phénoménologique de Marc Richir**

István Fazakas

Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Charles University Prague, Czech Academy of Sciences (AVCR)

*«Rien n'imagine d'être / sauf nous / et cela fait de nous la bête /  
d'un labyrinthe d'air / où chacun  
ne guette que lui-même /  
entre le dit qui meurt et le non-dit qui va mourir.» (Bernard Noël: L'été langue morte)*

C'est sans aucun doute dans l'œuvre de M. Richir qu'on peut aujourd'hui trouver les fondements phénoménologiques d'une anthropologie qui conçoit l'homme – pour reprendre la définition proposée récemment par A. Schnell – comme homo imaginans. En effet, la refonte de la phénoménologie effectuée par M. Richir, et qui consiste dans la substitution du registre de la phantasia à celui de la perception, permet d'ouvrir le chantier immense d'une anthropologie phénoménologique qui se donne la tâche d'élucider les dimensions phantastiques et imaginaires de la vie humaine. L'ouverture de ce chantier est marquée par la publication de «Phantasia, imagination, affectivité» et par

la confrontation de la phénoménologie avec la psychanalyse et les psychopathologies qui, pour M. Richir, «sont un véritable ‘révélateur’» à l’intérieur du champ de l’anthropologie phénoménologique. Dans notre présentation nous proposons de prendre comme fil conducteur l’analyse des fantasmes. Nous allons montrer que ce que la psychanalyse a révélé sous le nom des fantasmes (Luftschloss) peut être décrit, selon M. Richir, à l’aide des concepts issus de la phénoménologie de la phantasia de Husserl et nous allons, de plus près, nous concentrer sur le concept du Phantomleib proposé par M. Richir. L’enjeu de notre présentation est ainsi de mettre en évidence la dimension charnelle (leiblich) des simulacres qu’implique une définition de l’homme comme homo imaginans.

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### **A new spatial primacy of intersubjectivity: khora**

Elvira Groza

Seminar de Cercetare Interdisciplinară a Religiilor și Ideologiilor,

Babeș-Bolyai University, Romania

Teodora Groza,

University of Groningen, Netherlands

Babeș-Bolyai University, Romania

The notion of intersubjectivity appears as an overcoming of the Husserlian transcendental subject. The corporeal constitution of the phenomenological ipse reveals an openness towards the other, an other that does not constitute a mere outer consciousness, but a factor that enables ipseity. For Husserl, the consciousness is kinaesthetic: the subject embodies an over there which is interiorized as a here from which the whole space-perception develops. However, the subject cannot detach from his own spatiality; he cannot perceive himself as an over there. Therefore, the space the subject perceives is a space in which his own position is cut, and this cutting remains to him unperceivable. The subject needs the immediacy of somebody’s embodied presence for whom he will be an over there: in this encounter the space-constitution of the subject becomes a whole. The aim of this paper is to assess the primacy of spatiality in the emergence of intersubjectivity. The research does not limit to the theories on the symbiosis between spatiality and intersubjectivity belonging to, inter alia, Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean-Luc Marion but rather seeks to establish a new spatial primacy of intersubjectivity, namely the khora. Khora will be problematized as a receptacle which enables the encounter of the other to take place, yet without a merging of the two different subjects.

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## **Subject Body and Experience in Phenomenological Philosophy**

Codruța Hainic

Babeș-Bolyai University, Romania

The specific concern for phenomenological psychology can be found in Husserl's imperative "back to the things themselves". In this respect, applying phenomenological philosophy to psychology means to focus on people's perception of the world in which they live. Ultimately, this leads to research focusing on people's lived experiences. The aim of this paper is to explore how philosophical phenomenology can contribute to the development of empirical and hermeneutical methods regarding psychological phenomena. I submit that it does so by analyzing the existential dimension and the meaning of human experiences, as they spontaneously occur in the course of daily life. The first step is to think the body in a subjective way, as a phenomenal, lived body, and to see in what way individual experiences can be linked together. Subsequently, I investigate how experiencers are in space, and show that, unlike things, they must obtain access to space and to self-localization in space in order to be experientially in it.

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## **The Phenomenology of Doubles and Psychoanalysis**

James William Hctor

University of Kent, U.K.

A common view that pervades psychoanalytic literature is that, twinship is a result of each twin being a failed self which results in a singular entity or a we-self. Hence, I explore how this so-called we-self arises by utilising the narrative account of self. I turn to twins' accounts of autobiographical memory, which demonstrates that they construct a we-narrative to give consistency to their wealth of shared experiences. However, I argue that twins do not construct their we-narrative for themselves. Rather, they develop the narrative so that others can comprehend them. To understand this, it is necessary to clarify the phenomenology of doubles. That is, what occurs when a singleton has experience of identical looking twins. I argue that a phenomenological experience of twins creates ontological uncertainty in one's practical experience, because they cannot easily assimilate twins into a normative model of selfhood. This, in turn, removes the difference between each twin, and thus, they are reduced to a singular entity. This then becomes the basis of the narratives that singletons tell about twins. The process then becomes circular, as twins—to make themselves comprehensible to others—construct a we-narrative, which only serves to reinforce the notion of the we-self. Thus, it becomes clear that twinship is not the consequence of two failed selves rather it arises because of the embodied engagement of two subjects of experience or minimal selves.

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## **Integration through communication. A philosophical reading of the analytical situation**

Kata Dóra Kiss

Central European University, Hungary

During an ordinary conversation, a slip of the tongue is considered as a mistake: we intended to announce something, but we say something else by accident. Sigmund Freud was one of the first, who appointed that a slip is not only a failure, but it refers to restrained or repressed impulse or intention, therefore it has a meaning and can be interpreted. Freud's term for misspeaking is "symptomatic action" that implies another important finding of the psychoanalytical theory, namely that neurotic symptoms have the same logic. When I am "wanting-to-say" something, but my possibilities for expression are limited, e.g. by my social status, my culturally determined position or by the margins of the verbal language, I have to circumvent my situatedness. The neurotic symptom is one specific form of this act. When I am crying, cramping, shouting, or on the contrary, I lose the faculty of speech, I could not move or think, I am "wanting-to-say" something, and these symptoms are functioning as the envelope of my message. In this sense, different kinds of neurosis are forms of communication by the subversion of the socially determined signs and signifiers. Freud had developed the method of psychoanalysis because he realized that only the inclusion of this "wanting-to-say" into the circuit of speech permits the symptom to unfold into a message. It follows that the main question of the therapy is "What does the symptom mean?" Regardless of the best intention of the analyst, the institutionally determined power relation between doctor and patient constantly jeopardizes the symptoms communicative potential, for example through misinterpretation. It leads to the failure of the original intention of the therapy.

The presentation has two focuses. First, it would like to give a glimpse of some of those attitudes in psychological treatment that work against the integration of the symptoms into a communicative situation. Consequentially, these could easily take away the patient's status as a subject. The second part of the presentation would like to show an alternative attitude towards patients through Sándor Ferenczi's work. The Hungarian psychoanalyst was a pupil of Freud, yet, he had reversed his master's idea of "therapeutic abstinence" and emphasized the empathic reciprocity and mutual encounter in the analytic situation. Ferenczi had made multiple attempts to reshape the doctor-patient relationship of the analysis and to preserve his patient's subjectivity. Irrespectively of the success of these tries, he had sharply recognized the issues of status, power, and control in the analytic situation, that makes Ferenczi's ideas still relevant and useful for the critique of the psycho-sciences.

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## **Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology**

László Komorjai  
ELTE, Hungary

The primary penchant of phenomenology for the things themselves is clearly in harmony with its basic methodological standard according to which it is 'descriptive psychology': a purely descriptive science, ultimately free from any theoretical speculation. These two features are directly related: phenomenology can only resort to pure description, if it has access to the things themselves. However, it might seem questionable whether phenomenology can remain faithful to the above-mentioned methodological standard, even when it analyses spheres which, *per definitionem*, cannot be directly accessed 'in themselves'. Such spheres are, for instance, Husserl's passive, pre-reflective or absolute (time)consciousness, the Freudian unconscious, William James' sensible totality or Bergson's *durée*. In my lecture – focusing mainly on Bergson's case, taking his intuitive method as a form of 'phenomenology' – I address the question whether it is necessary that phenomenology presupposes such spheres, and if so, whether it can still be called, at least in some modified sense, a 'purely' descriptive science.

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## **The function of phenomenology for psychoanalysis**

Karlsson Gunnar  
Department of Education, Stockholm University, Sweden

In my talk I will discuss different aspects in which phenomenology can assist psychoanalysis. We can roughly count on two levels of suffering in psychoanalysis that requires different aetiological explanations as well as therapeutic approaches. The phenomenological notion of consciousness-as-intentional has an important clinical role in the psychoanalytic project. The earliest suffering has to do with deficits in the intentionality of consciousness/self-consciousness due to an insufficient containment and yields difficulties in affirming existence, in contrast to a neurotic suffering due to repressed unconscious intra-psychic conflicts. Furthermore, phenomenology has a role in epistemologically clarifying the conditions upon which the psychoanalytic unconscious can be constructed. When it comes to the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious I would claim that consciousness is prior to the unconscious, both in time and from a (phenomeno)logical point of view. I will suggest that the Freudian notion of the unconscious phenomenologically can be understood as a construction based on ordinary lifeworld experiences.

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## **L'acte thérapeutique trans-noétique et logothérapie intégrative**

Rolf Kühn

Fribourg-en-Brisgau, Germany

Il existe structurellement trois possibilités sur lesquelles l'acte thérapeutique peut se fonder en dernière analyse:

- 1) Il y a un signifiant ou sens qui convient à toute situation existentielle (Frankl).
- 2) Il n'y a aucun signifiant qui peut définir le sujet dans son auto-compréhension. Il n'y a que l'acte libérateur de tout imaginaire ou symbolique pour admettre le réel inconscient ou symptomal (Freud et Lacan).
- 3) Il y a l'un et l'autre, sens intentionnel et désir pulsionnel qui se nouent constamment dans une vie subjective qui me fait vivre sans négation ou affirmation transcendentes secondaires par rapport à une origine auto-affective immanente (Henry).

Pour montrer que l'acte thérapeutique avec ses transferts inévitables entre patient et thérapeute implique l'intégration qui va du désir au sens et vice versa nous allons interpréter ici l'analyse existentielle de Frankl dans une perspective trans-noétique. Cette dimension ne laisse de côté aucune réalité de l'être humain, ce qui permet en même temps l'intégration d'autres méthodes psychothérapeutiques, si l'acte thérapeutique l'exige. C'est en ce sens que nous plaçons pour une "logothérapie intégrative" qui se dégage de l'ensemble des textes de Frankl et surtout de son conseil de "dégurufication" qu'il a prôné lui-même à l'égard de sa personne et sa pensée pour développer une logothérapie inventive par ses successeurs souhaités libres.

*[full text available / not attending]*

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## **Übertragung und Gegenübertragung als therapeutische Grundproblematik für die Supervision**

### **Eine radikal phänomenologische Auseinandersetzung mit Konzepten der Tiefenpsychologie und Psychoanalyse Jacques Lacans**

Rolf Kühn

Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Germany

In der neo-psychoanalytischen Lacanschule wird die Originarität der Subjektivierung des Selbst nicht zuallererst den Affekten und Gefühlen zugeschrieben, sondern der sprachlichen Signifikantenkette, so dass nach dieser Auffassung auch die Übertragung nicht in einer Modalisierung von Gefühlen seitens des Patienten hauptsächlich verankert wird (Lacan 2001: 135ff.; Rogozinski 2006: 66ff.; Gondek u. Tengelyi 2011: 304ff.). Vielmehr ist die Übertragung nach solcher Voraussetzung eine Art der in der Analyse/Therapie auftretenden Reproduktion oder Wiederholung als imaginär-symbolisches Begehren, welches weitgehend vom Subjekt nicht bemerkt werde, weshalb auch Kritik an der Inflation des Begriffs der Übertragung innerhalb der zeitgenössischen Psychoanalyse angebracht sei, weil er fast alles bezeichne, was sich in der analytisch-therapeutischen Praxis ereigne. Freud hatte den Übertragungsbegriff zunächst 1905 in den „Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie“ eingeführt, um damit auf „Neuaufgaben und Nachbildungen von denjenigen Regungen und Phantasien“ hinzuweisen, die während der

Analyse entstehen, wobei eine frühere Person durch die Person des Arztes oder Analytikers ersetzt werde. Dadurch werden einstige psychische Erlebnisse nicht als vergangen erlebt, sondern als aktuelle Beziehung zum Analytiker/Therapeuten, und auf der perzeptiven Ebene kann es sich hierbei um visuelle, auditive, olfaktorische, taktile Wahrnehmungen handeln, die den Analysanden/Patienten an manche Merkmale beim früheren Elternteil oder auch an andere wichtige Personen aus der Vergangenheit erinnern.

*[full text available / not attending]*

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### **What do we name body?**

Dorothee Legrand

CNRS, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Archives Husserl, Paris, France

What do we name body? This question is here framed both by phenomenology and psychoanalysis. Phenomenology provides us with a powerful method, the *epochè*, which opens the way to suspend any bodily intuitive evidence. Classically, however, phenomenology starts by interrupting its *epochè*, by the reduction to that which is assumed to present the strongest resistance: the transcendental ego primordially experiencing itself as sensitive flesh. Psychoanalysis, contrastively, is practiced outside of any transcendental framework. This is where we propose to perform a radical *epochè*. In this framework that avoids being saturated by presence, both the body-as-*object* and the flesh-as-*subject* are bracketed. Moreover, the body cannot be thought of as a transcendental *origin* – be it conscious, or unconscious. How can we then think anew of how one *becomes* a body? It will appear that the body ought to be *singularized* by the opening of an *empty* space between bodies, i.e. by the suspension of any body-to-body fulfilment. *Speech* is precisely that which allows *separating* while *linking* bodies to each other, thereby subjectifying *one* body as different and non-indifferent to *another*. By using (post-)phenomenological tools in a psychoanalytic framework, we will show that conceptual and clinical work ought to be associated to detail the structure of the speaking body.

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### **Phenomenology and Imagination in Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant**

Zsuzsanna Mariann Lengyel

Department of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös

Loránd University, Hungary

The main aim of my proposed contribution is to provide an overview of development of Heidegger's account of imagination (Einbildungskraft) with a special focus to the affinity between phenomenology and psychology. In the first section, I will reconstruct how – by his reading Husserl's Logical Investigations and his Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness (1905-08) – the early Heidegger got to know the function of imagination that it can open the realm of the things themselves. I argue that Heidegger –

similarly to Husserl – saw an essential connection between the human imagination and the exploration of phenomenological horizon. In *The Basic Problem of Phenomenology* (1927) Heidegger also worked out it from Aristotle's ontology of thing whereas it is the most important to highlight the participation of imagination in the knowledge of thing. In the second section, I will demonstrate that in his *Kant-book* (1929), Heidegger gave up his plan to further think the viewpoints envisioned by Husserl and Neo-Kantians, and he entirely transformed his previous concept of imagination out of the chapter on the Schematism of Kant and the problem of temporality. My core thesis is that in this period Heidegger's account of imagination is concern with the emergence of schemes of our thinking and operation of our human understanding, that is to say, Heidegger went beyond a psychological Kant-interpretation of the age, at the same time he turned to discover the field of phenomenological unconscious.

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### **Collective sedimentation and collective unconscious. A phenomenology of collective unconscious after Edmund Husserl**

Bence Peter Marosan  
independent researcher

“Geschichte ist von vornherein nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung des Miteinander und Ineinander von ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung.”  
(Husserl, *Husserliana* 6: 380)

Unconscious is a central topic of phenomenology, and it was also a serious problem in Edmund Husserl's late philosophy. However authors and philosophers, treating the question of unconscious in Husserl, made almost exclusively comparisons between Freud and Husserl, (there are lots of articles and also a number of books on the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis). The problem with that approach is that it only focuses to one single aspect of unconscious: namely the individual one. But especially in the late Husserl intersubjectivity and history were fundamental issues, which makes it plausible *to raise the question concerning a phenomenology of collective unconscious, and make justified comparisons between Husserl and Jung.*

When Husserl treated the problem of unconscious, first of all in his late genetic phenomenology, he did so within the context of implicit effect of unnoticed contents and sedimentation of already formed sense-formations (*Husserliana* 11, 33, 42). This treatment of the problem is limited to the sphere of individual subjectivity, and thus attracts a comparison with Freud's notion of unconscious. But such an approach misses the fact that individual subjectivity in the late Husserl is from the very beginning an intersubjectively articulated, socio-historically and culturally shaped functioning. According to Husserl every emergence, articulation and fixation of sense take place in an inherently intersubjective medium. The ultimate substratum of individual subjectivity in Husserl is transcendental intersubjectivity. So: as emergence and sedimentation of sense have an individual aspect, they have an intersubjective, socio-historical side too. The reservoir of such collectively formed and fixed sense is communal memory and collective unconscious. These collective sedimentations affect the surface life of social and

individual existence in an implicit and essential way.

In my interpretation, all what is said in Husserl's late works about history, intersubjectivity, life-world and communication, opens the way towards a phenomenology of collective unconscious, and make plausible a comparison between Husserl's theory of history as collective sense-formation and sedimentation and Jung's construction of collective unconscious. After a reconstruction of Husserl's conception of collective sedimentation, I would like to deal with the problem how could be this notion connected with the Jungian theory of archetypes and symbols in the collective unconscious of communities.

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### **The Genetic Account of the Individuation of Subjectivity: A Husserlian Perspective**

Luciana Priolo

University of Crete, Greece

In this paper, I examine the dynamics of individuation that occurs in the pre-predicative dimension of subjectivity. I begin with the discussion of how the unifying role of the Ego is grounded in the inner temporal connection between *Erlebnissen*. Given this, I intend to elucidate the way in which another, associative this time, level of these unifying structures of consciousness is formed. Following Husserl's genetic investigations, I will claim that the 'typifying' regularity of tendencies within the passive laws of experience contribute to a constantly self-renewing singularization of the 'I of the interest'. In particular, I will maintain that the latter happens in the synthesis of anticipation and its obstructions. This kind of anti-Cartesian, pre-reflective and feeling-related centration of an I grounds the reciprocal co-belongingness (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) of the apperceived intentional objects and gives rise to an evolving experiential history of the subject. My attempt is to show how these always adjustable sedimentations of the character-forming experiential resources are constituted and, in this sense, represent the passive components of the will. Therefore, I intend to maintain that the analysis of the individuating processes of subjectivity may provide a significant contribution to the developing dialogue between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The peculiar functioning of these processes allows us to re-elaborate the conception of the unconscious and to lay grounds for a non-causalistic account of behavior and agency.

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## **Subjects of Desire**

Delia Popa

Villanova University, Villanova, PA, USA

How should the phenomenological subjectivity be understood in regard to the critical elements brought into light by the psychoanalytical research? Is the intentional subject also a subject of desire? Is desire assigning us as subjects of an experience open to a phenomenological account? Husserl's investigation of the transcendental ego reveals its ultimate grounding in the stream of life carrying its acts and its positions. But how is this hidden binding of the ego affecting the economy of the desire moving us in relation to each other? Between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, I will focus on the role of phantasms in the connection between unconscious drives and conscious activity.

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## **The Unconscious as Body. M. Merleau-Ponty and E. T. Gendlin**

Jan Puc

Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic

The aim of the paper is to describe two ways phenomenology deals with the challenge of the unconscious.

For Merleau-Ponty, the unconscious is a case of the "primordial symbolism" of the perceived world, which he also finds in indirect speech of literature and painting of synesthetic qualities of things. Thanks to projection, the repressed desire appears in the world. Subject of the unconscious is body as body schema and dynamics of changes of the unconscious is clarified by the concept of "institution". Thus, the unconscious is neither knowledge the inner censor denied us (Freud), nor knowledge we ourselves withhold from ourselves (Sartre). It is rather third mode of cognition between total knowledge and utter ignorance, "presence of absence".

However, this interpretation misses an important point as it does not account for the active defense that hinders subject to become aware of her experience. But can this unconscious investment in repression become object of phenomenological description at all? During his research of success rate in psychotherapy, Gendlin noticed that the interpretation of past events, that a Freudian psychoanalyst offers and that even Merleau-Ponty adopted as a model of therapy, cannot overcome client's defense and induce therapeutic change unless it is supplemented by symbolization of the present felt sense of her situation. The repressed desire merges with bodily feeling and the unconscious takes shape of stopped feeling process that can eventually be reconstituted in the course of therapy.

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## **Losing reality. A phenomenological approach to schizophrenia**

Imola Részeg

Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

In my presentation I will talk about R. D. Laing's phenomenological approach to schizophrenia. In his book, entitled *The Divided Self: An existential study in Sanity and Madness*, Laing argues that if we try to understand a schizophrenic person from an existential-phenomenological point of view, his strange behaviour gains meaning. Every oral manifestation, gesture and action of schizophrenic is part of a self-defense mechanism, ultimately based on a feeling of ontological insecurity. The world and the others for such a person are an enormous threat because they can deprive him of his identity, autonomy and subjectivity. According to Laing, the process of going mad starts with a division in the self: the self that thinks does not identify anymore with its lived body. But the denial of the body leads to the loss of all reality and the disintegration of the self or self-structure, which in the end collapses. Despite the fact that since the 1960s, when Laing wrote his book, medical science and psychology has made a huge development, his explanation remains one of the most coherent account of the schizophrenic phenomenon.

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## **A Psychoanalysis of Individuation:**

### **The Affective Heart of Repression in Michel Henry**

Max Schaefer

University of Limerick, Ireland

The psychoanalysis of Freud and Lacan finds a pivotal resource in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. In particular, the reactive unconscious formulated in Freud and Lacan stands as a development of Schopenhauer's account of repression. Schopenhauer's study of repression is itself an offspring of the modern "ontology of representation," (GP, 3) according to which appearing is an ecstasis, the opening of a distance and relation between appearing and a foreign appearance, between the seeing of a subject and its object. In Schopenhauer, this ecstatic phenomenality arises as a distance between affectivity and will, on account of which the latter can enable or prevent the affective tonality of certain representational contents from ascending to the level of consciousness as an ecstatic order of appearing. Henry maintains that this breach between affectivity and will poses a problem for Schopenhauer's account of repression: as we will show, it leaves Schopenhauer unable to account for how the will can know which representations, as determined by affectivity (life), it needs to repress so as to safeguard the integrity of consciousness. Such a problem notwithstanding, we will show that the distance Schopenhauer interjects between affectivity and will determines repression as a function of consciousness, in its need for distance (liberation) from the endless and ineffectual drive of affectivity. This will be to show that Schopenhauer's account of repression lays the groundwork for a psychoanalysis of renunciation, which strives to isolate the living being from its basis in life. By speaking to Henry's account of affectivity as an immanent mode of appearing that provides a transcendental account of

knowledge, we will show how Henry seeks to address the aforementioned problem in Schopenhauer's study of repression. This will be to demonstrate that repression is a function of affectivity, in its endless need for self-growth in the world of life. In so doing, we maintain that Henry's account of affectivity provides grounds for shifting the aim of psychoanalysis away from renunciation toward a releasing of the living being to her potentiality for individuation in the world of life.

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### **Merleau-Ponty's lived body as pre-reflexive cogito**

Luís Aguiar Sousa

Nova Institute of Philosophy, University of Lisbon, Portugal

In my talk, I will analyse Merleau-Ponty's notion of the cogito, in particular in his *Phenomenology of Perception*. As is well known, one of the central aims of Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* is to formulate a radically new conception of subjectivity, that is, of introducing the idea of embodied subjectivity. My starting point will be the idea that Merleau-Ponty's lived body constitutes a new version of Sartre's pre-reflexive cogito, but of this notion not exactly as it was presented in the latter's classic *Being and Nothingness*, but rather in his first work, the *Transcendence of the Ego*. The lived body is the most elementary form of subjectivity, upon which all other, more complex, forms are built. As a rudimentary form of consciousness, the lived body opens us to the world, it accomplishes our most primitive contact with being. For both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre all consciousness must ipso facto be self-consciousness. This does not imply that all consciousness involves explicit reflection upon oneself. On the contrary, just like pre-reflective consciousness, as it is introduced in the *Transcendence of the Ego*, Merleau-Ponty's lived body is impersonal, anonymous. Although this consciousness possesses a certain kind of reflexivity, or otherwise it would not be consciousness, it is not closed in on itself, rather it immediately finds itself outside in the world. For Merleau-Ponty, the fundamental act by which the lived body is not only in contact with the world, but also and primordially with itself is perception. This self-certainty of perception is precisely the true cogito. Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not relinquish the notion of cogito, but rather, just like Sartre, radically reformulates and transfigures it. However, although we are certain of ourselves, of our own existence, in a pre-reflexive manner, the cogito is not transparent to itself, but rather fundamentally opaque. The personal ego, the reflexive subject, is based on the impersonal or, as Merleau-Ponty also has it, on the tacit cogito. In other words, our pre-reflexive immersion in the world is the condition of the possibility of reflection and therewith of the reflexive cogito. The latter does not efface the lived body's silent presence. I will end my presentation by characterizing the relation between these two subjects, between the spoken and the tacit cogito, as one of expression. In other words, I will show how the ego of reflection is to be seen as expressive of the lived body considered as tacit cogito.

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## **On Counting without Numbers (Taking Children into Account)**

Andrei Simionescu-Panait,  
The Romanian Society for Phenomenology (SRF), Romania

Husserl's main problem from his Philosophy of Arithmetic was about the way in which we can constitute numbers and a subsequent arithmetic with the help of our flux of consciousness. How can numbers be constituted as standalone and specific objectual appearances that are discriminated from the act of counting things from my kinaesthesia based lifeworld? What repertoire of consciousness favors a switch of abstracting areas of my lived world into numbers? My article has three parts. First, I reinterpret Husserl's dilemma from his Philosophy of Arithmetic through his later developments on embodiment, kinaesthesia and tactility. I offer a phenomenological description of what tactile counting means. The idea that an embodied sense of "having counted something" arises in haptic kinaesthesia is correlated with Susan Goldin-Meadow's research on gestures when teaching children how to count. This is the focus of the second part of my article. Last, I advance a thesis that uses both strains of research, but ultimately remains phenomenological. I distinguish between a weak and a strong abstraction. The difference refers to the I-can that I form when abstracting. In weak abstraction, I form an I-can about what I abstract: I count ten apples and obtain a sense of control over the apples that I have just counted. In strong abstraction, I form an I-can about the abstracted object, regardless of the concrete object that I abstracted from. When performing a strong abstraction, I get a sense of what I can do with this "ten" object, regardless of the perceptual and kinaesthetic content that apples sport. The intentional difference between weak and strong abstraction showcases a constitutive idea: acts of strong abstraction can fully form their I-can about maneuvering the abstracted object if they are supported complementary but specific kinaesthetic act, a kinaesthesia that I perform in order to try to abstract. This recoils on what abstraction is and opens a kinaesthesia-driven account about it.

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## **Moving through dreaming: a phenomenology of dreams**

Alexandru-Gabriel Stan  
University of Bucharest, Romania

With the waning of Freudian psychoanalysis, the study of dreams calls for a philosophical approach. What can dreams tell us about the „structures” of our experience? I hold that contemporary phenomenology is a viable option for approaching this question. In particular, a phenomenology that is centered on the animate form and on the Husserlian I-can is one that can showcase how dreams are modulations of regular daytime kinaesthesia-driven experience.

First off, I will use the concepts of kinaesthesia and the I-can to describe the essential capacity to create predictions about the world in which I move. I aim to pinpoint the coordinates for a concept of active inference. I will then invoke Karl Friston's free energy principle to show how our oneiric faculties are rooted in our predictions and in the corporeal-kinaesthetic reality of inferencing. Lastly, I will draw my conclusions about the limits of a phenomenology of dreams when it becomes involved in offering pertinent

descriptions of invariants of experience. I hold that dreaming is a way of moving, but only through inference.

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### **An Ego's History, Transcendental and Psychological**

Sándor Sajó

ELTE Institute for Art Theory and Media Studies, Department of Aesthetics, Hungary

Can there be "a transcendental history of the ego"? If history is necessarily empirical, and the transcendental ego pure, hardly. Then, how can a term like transcendental history figure in phenomenology at all?

In order to answer this question, the sense of the distinction transcendental/empirical is to be revisited. Instead of a hierarchical relation, their interconnectedness is to be shown. I will argue that neither a transcendental, nor an empirical philosophy can do without the other.

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### **The Barred Subject of desire, and Immediate Self-Awareness in Meditation.**

Zsigmond Szabó

independent researcher, Hungary

Lacan often claims that sexual difference is the ultimate limitation making any consistent ontological/philosophical description of the human condition impossible. The presence of the barred subject makes the symbolically articulated reality incomplete or inconsistent, and the Real is therefore impossible to attain. In many age-old meditative traditions, however, they claim that the immediate self-awareness available to any human consciousness, irrespective of the sexual difference, is capable of dissolving the split introduced by the individual subject's desires and egotism, and allow the individual to realize its true nature, the peaceful bliss of universal consciousness, from which it is no different. In my presentation I would like to criticize Slavoj Žižek's concept of 'originary antagonism' and his consequent dismissal of Buddhist spirituality.

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### **“An experience that brought something *spectral* into the present”**

#### **Nostalgia Between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis**

Dylan Trigg

University College Dublin, Ireland

In distinction to anxiety, the history of nostalgia within phenomenology is sparse. This oversight is surprising, given that nostalgia generates insight into the time, space, unconsciousness, and embodiment. This paper addresses this oversight through pairing phenomenology with psychoanalysis. Engaging with Lacan and Merleau-Ponty on the mirror image, I argue that the structure of nostalgia is predicated on the lure of *temporal identification*. Nostalgia, I argue, presents us with a vivid illustration of how an image

can be deployed to both generate temporal identification and render ambiguity tolerable, insofar as the temporality constructed through nostalgia is stipulated on a time of resistance and stasis, a time in which perceptual experience and self-identity is championed through the denial of time as on-going. I end by considering the close relation between the specular image and the spectral image, taking my cue from Goethe's account of nostalgia as "an experience that brought something *spectral* into the present."

**Keywords:** Phantasy, Imagination, Time, Embodiment, Phenomenology, Psychoanalysis.

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### **Thinking Machine (Artificial) Intelligence**

Joaquin Trujillo

independent researcher, Greece

This article phenomenologically and cybernetically exhibits the meaning of thinking and intelligence to inform the next level of machine (artificial) intelligence (MI), or what the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) calls, "contextual adaptation," or "third wave" MI (MI3). It contends that working alongside cybernetics (systems analysis), that is, appropriately aligning itself with the method's perspective and assertions, or at least the most fundamental ones, phenomenology, or, more precisely, as applied here, hermeneutic-phenomenology (hermeneutics), is able to make a more exact and concrete contribution to the technology's development. The article comprises five parts. Part one describes MI3. Part two lays out the phenomenology of thinking and intelligence. Part three describes thinking and intelligence cybernetically and elucidates basic correspondences between phenomenology and cybernetics that free the former to leverage the latter to ground itself within the scientific dialogue about MI3. It also describes three variables it postulates have limited the ability of cybernetics to contribute independently to MI3 research. Part four exhibits the meaning of "intelligence" in machines. Part five propositionally identifies an incompatibility within the thinking of some engineers concerning the design of MI3, correlates it with a surmised prereflective tendency to anthropomorphize the technology, and suggests it may be misdirecting the technology's development.

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### **Fatherhood's subjective experience in the face of adolescent children' depressive symptomatology and suicide attempt**

Milagros Rocío Saldaña Tumbay

Pontifical Catholic University of Peru

Faculty of Psychology, Peru

The fatherhood's experience of living with a teenage son or daughter who present depressive symptomatology and has tried to commit suicide constitutes a subjective experience in and of itself. For the father, these adverse conditions represent a challenge in his constituted role and causes an emotional impact which must be analyzed by considering his subjective constitution. The aim of this research is to explore this experience by using a phenomenological qualitative approach. To do that, semi-structured interviews and the application of a test of incomplete sentences were applied to parents

whose adolescent children received ambulatory care after a first suicide attempt in a psychiatric hospital in Peru. The results show that participants experience various emotions that involve impotence, anger, sadness, guilt and relief around three stages: the onset of symptoms, attendance at a psychiatric hospital and the perception of remission of the symptoms. It was found that although at the beginning the fathers find it difficult to get involved affectively with their younger children, they are able to recover the bond through of the reconstitution and reorganization of their role.

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**Les modèles de l'inconscient: phénoménologie, psychanalyse et sciences cognitives  
(Models of the Theory of Unconscious: Phenomenology, Psychoanalysis, Cognitive  
Sciences)**

Tamás Ullmann

Department of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy,  
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary

The Freudian discovery of the unconscious has been a constant challenge for phenomenology and for the philosophy of mind in the last century. In this lecture, I first present very briefly the history of the concept of unconscious from the philosophical point of view. Then, in the second step, I analyze the psychoanalytical theory of unconscious and argue that Freudian psychoanalysis elaborates two relatively different models of the unconscious, one based on repression (*Verdrängung, refoulement*), the other on defense (*Abwehr; défense*). In the third part, I try to analyze the relation of phenomenology and that of cognitive science to the general concept of the unconscious and to psychoanalytical models of the unconscious.